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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on a case study of a Portuguese packaging firm, this paper examines how vertical 
integration of the supplier serves as a vehicle for the full outsourcing of the client firms' needs 
in a solution that reduces transaction costs, favors specialization, and permits small and 
medium-sized firms to develop competencies that may be exploited in a wide array of 
projects. Vertical integration by the supplier (a governance decision) is a strategic response to 
changes in the sourcing model of the clients. Client-supplier relationships have inter-spatial 
and inter-temporal value that surpasses spot market exchanges. 
 
Keywords: Strategic outsourcing. Vertical integration. Internationalization.  Case study 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing number of firms are outsourcing the majority of their traditional activities to focus 
internally on only a few. For example, NIKE, Inc., focuses on pre- and post-production, and 
outsources 100% of its shoe manufacture (QUINN; HILMER, 1995). In fact, according to 
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 Corbett & Associates (1999), outsourcing has risen 18% across industries in 1999-2000. The 
rise in industrial outsourcing is further remarkable when looking at the US food metal 
packaging industry which was dominated by self-production of the producers of final goods 
(54%) in 1985, but by 1996, the US metal packaging industry was dominated by two 
multinational enterprises (MNEs): Silgan Container (39%) and Crown Cork & Seal (30%), 
with a joint market share of 69% (source: The Canmaker, July 1997). In industries such as the 
auto industry, supply chains are being redesigned. For example, automobile assemblers no 
longer have equity stakes in joint ventures that supply components specific to their auto 
models but instead outsource to independent suppliers the manufacture of a variety of 
components (HENNART, 1988). Outsourcing relationships seem increasingly based on stable 
network models of inter-firm relationships, rather than on arm's length exchanges that 
facilitate inter-firm sharing of proprietary knowledge, and the development of new product 
offerings, and benefits the firms involved. (DYER; NOBEOKA, 2000).  
Sourcing models, or client-suppliers relations, have been extensively researched 
within the realms of strategic management literature. The typical vertical integration, which 
achieved its height in Ford Motor Co. River Rouge complex, has been gradually replaced by 
flexible organizational formats (BUCKLEY; CASSON, 1998) that promote the specialization 
of the partner firms. Recognizing hybrid models to organizing transactions, management 
scholars now focus on cooperative relationships (MADHOK; TALLMAN, 1998; 
WILLIAMSON, 1985). Under certain situations, cooperative relationships can increase joint 
efficiency, foster innovation, allow the partners to concentrate on their core capabilities 
(PRAHALAD; HAMEL, 1990; HAMEL, 1991), reduce firms' investment in specialized 
assets, and mitigate transaction costs (WILLIAMSON, 1985). Sourcing models seem to be 
idiosyncratic to, and contingent on, inter-temporal and inter-spatial relationships client-
supplier. Sourcing models depend on factors such as the focal firm's resources (BARNEY, 
1991), dynamic capabilities (TEECE et al, 1997), technological change (AFUAH, 2001) and 
uncertainty (TEECE, 1992), learning intent (POWELL, 1998), supply-side uncertainties 
(HARRIGAN, 1985), the ability to appropriate the returns from research and development 
(TEECE, 1992), and the characteristics of the transactions (WILLIAMSON, 1985; 
HENNART, 1991). Both client and supplier firms seem to have interest in stabilizing the 
relationship and create trust to override potential opportunistic behaviors (GULATI, 1995; 
GRANOVETTER, 1985). In sum, firms' sourcing decisions are contingent upon a myriad of 
factors that lead to hierarchical, hybrid, or market-based governance forms of activities up and 
down the product value chain.  
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 In this paper, we suggest that the traditional analysis of benefits and hazards of vertical 
integration and outsourcing per se using a transaction costs perspective is insufficient. From a 
dynamic perspective, we argue that vertical integration by the supplier (i.e., governance 
model decision) may be a strategic response to changes in the sourcing model of the client 
industries (sourcing model). We support our analysis on the case study of a medium-sized 
Portuguese metallic packaging manufacturer, COLEP. We observe that governance decisions 
can neither be exclusively based on the benefits and hazards of each organizational form, nor 
on the economics of the product and inter-firm transactions. The supplier's governance 
decisions need to consider the co-evolution of the client firm and its environment, as well as 
the potential to generate firm-specific advantages (e.g. skills, knowledge, capabilities) that 
may be exploited beyond traditional national boundaries. Echoing Osegowitsch and Madhok 
(2003), we conclude that vertical integration strategies are far from dead, and rather 
contemporary vertical integration is driven by learning objectives, the development of 
capabilities that may be exploited in multiple markets and projects, and the need to adapt to 
new sourcing paradigms of the client firms. 
 
2 LITERATURE AND CASE STUDY 
 
In the next sections we integrate research on vertical integration, transaction cost 
theory, and models of strategic outsourcing with the analysis of the case study of COLEP.  
The process of collecting firm-specific information involved two main sources: (a) 
primary sources through open-ended, unstructured and conversational interviews in the firm 
followed by visits to the company's facilities; (b) secondary sources such as company reports, 
magazines, promotional handouts, previous studies, and personal contacts with industry 
specialists. The data gathering procedure was consistent with Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(1994) on case study research. 
COLEP, a Portuguese packaging company, was founded in 1965 as a metallic 
packaging manufacturer. COLEP gradually widened its product and activity portfolio through 
vertical integration of the packaging value chain. Founded as a decorative cans producer for 
industrial products, COLEP integrated lithography (in 1970), the production of aerosol 
containers (1972), the manufacture of plastic components (1973), contract filling of aerosol 
cans (1975), production of plastic containers (1982), contract filling of liquids (1983), and, in 
1984, the production of metallic containers for food products (source: company reports). 
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 These activities comprise the entire value chain of selected product segments. Thus, vertical 
integration allows COLEP to offer a full service that corresponds to the (full) outsourcing 
1
 needs of selected products and activities of client firms. In 1975, COLEP established 
a partnership with the multinational Johnson Wax (JW), and, in 1993, acquired Johnson 
Wax's Spanish contract-filling subsidiary in Valdemoro. More recently, COLEP advanced its 
internationalization strategy with a greenfield operation in Poland.  
 
2.1 THE INDUSTRY 
 
The metal packaging industry is very heterogeneous, with significant variations in the 
final product, and where standardization in some segments co-exists with differentiation in 
others. In such an industry it is important that firms encounter an unique positioning amidst 
competitors (CAVES; PORTER, 1977; PORTER, 1980; REGER; HUFF, 1993). COLEP's 
distinctiveness is built on a high level of vertical integration. Although there are numerous 
manufacturers of metal packaging and plastic components, and contract fillers, there is no 
other firm (at least in the EU) that carries in-house such wide array of activities of the 
packaging value chain: from lithography to distribution (MARTINS, 1996).  
For example, in the metal packaging industry we find small niche players such as 
Ormis, CMB/Colep or Vivancos in the production of containers for a narrow market segment 
(i.e., canned fish goods). Other firms, such as Neorelva, A.Freitas and Ferbal are specialists in 
metal containers for industrial products (e.g., paints, varnishes) and manufacture only in one 
country. Most contract fillers such as Fimper are small and do not manufacture the containers. 
The segments of cosmetics, hygiene, and consumer goods are dominated by self-production 
of the manufacturers. Finally, MNEs such as Lever, Procter & Gamble, Johnson or Gillette 
tend to focus on R&D, formulation and filling of their products, privileging outsourcing of 
small batches of mature products. It is in the full outsourcing of these batches that small to 
medium enterprises may find a viable niche.  
 
2.2 VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
A firm is vertically integrated when it owns or controls the assets in successive stages 
of the value chain. That is, if it has two or more adjacent economic activities under its 
                                                          
1
 The majority of activities outsourced by COLEP are manufacturing related. 
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 ownership control, and uses the outputs of backward stages as inputs in forward stages 
(FRONMUELLER; REED, 1996). There is substantial incentive for firms to vertically 
integrate, as indicated in prior literature. The incentive to vertically integrate depends on the 
type of production involved, the extent of transaction costs, the amount of specialized assets, 
the degree of market power at each stage of production, the separability of activities, and the 
amount of uncertainty concerning prices and costs. Costs may be decreased by avoiding 
market costs (JONES; HILL, 1988), by eliminating the distortion in input costs caused by 
imperfect competition in the upstream market (VERNON;  GRAHAM, 1971; WESTFIELD, 
1981), by reducing transaction costs (JONES; HILL, 1988; MAHONEY, 1992; 
WILLIAMSON, 1971), by decreasing uncertainty or asymmetric information, resulting in a 
more efficient use of inputs (GREEN, 1974; RIORDAN; SAPPINGTON, 1987), and by 
protecting proprietary technology (JONES; HILL, 1988).  
In addition, vertical integration strategies benefit firms by reducing or eliminating 
firm's dependence on external agents. Reducing the dependence on external agents is 
particularly important in cartelized markets, and when the access to inputs suffers from small 
numbers bargaining (WILLIAMSON, 1985). Vertical integration can also increase profits 
through higher prices by creating barriers to entry (BAIN, 1956; SALOP; SCHEFFMAN, 
1983), allowing price discrimination (PERRY, 1980; STIGLER, 1951), reducing service and 
advertising externalities (JONES; HILL, 1988; PERRY; GROFF, 1985), or providing a firm 
with power over buyers or suppliers (PORTER, 1980). 
The benefits for the firm accrue as higher efficiency through the control of the value 
chain (REEVE, 1990), higher flexibility (RICHARDSON, 1996), and ability to increase the 
value added of the products manufactured. This is more likely to occur in highly regulated 
industries, unstable environments, or/and as a result of the nature of the product and of the 
manufacturing technologies (MADHOK; TALLMAN, 1998).  
Although the benefits of vertical integration, namely in permitting firms to overcome 
many imperfections in the market for intermediate inputs (HENNART, 1982; RUGMAN, 
1981; AFUAH, 2001), have been recognized by transaction cost economics (WILLIAMSON, 
1985), vertical integration is a "two-edged" sword (AFUAH, 2001). This has been evidenced 
by the mixed empirical results on the performance implications of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration may not be a superior organizational form in unstable environments 
because it creates rigidities (TEECE, 1992), competency traps (LEVINTHAL; MARCH, 
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 1993), administrative burdens (WILLIAMSON, 1985), and increase firms' likelihood of 
failure in the presence of technological changes (AFUAH, 2001).  
The disadvantages of vertical integration emerge, essentially, from the insulation of 
the firm. First, the firm looking inward may be limited to local search behaviors 
(ROSENKOPF; NERKAR, 2001) and fail to capture market changes (RICHARDSON, 1996) 
that occur beyond its immediate landscape (LEVINTHAL, 1997; MARCH, 1991). Second, 
the management of a vertically integrated firm is more complex, and may result in 
administrative inefficiencies, and possibly higher production costs (MAHONEY, 1992). 
Third, firms benefit more from vertical integration the smaller are differences among the 
minimum efficient scales of the stages of production integrated and the scale of operation of 
the firm (CASSON & ASSOCIATES, 1986). At the outset, the firm should only focus on 
those activities that contribute to achieve its objectives, and that are supported by the firm's 
capabilities (HAMEL, 1991; TEECE et al., 1997) or firm-specific knowledge (GRANT, 
1996).  
In the metal packaging industry, and particularly in the case of Colep, we observe 
interesting features of the benefits of vertical integration worth revealing. COLEP's vertical 
integration is a response to both its clients' needs, and its internal efficiency requirements. The 
clients seek partners to whom they might outsource the entire value chain of selected products 
(generally small to medium batches of uniform products, or products in which they have a 
competitive disadvantage). Internally, vertical integration permits COLEP to increase the 
products' value added, and to overcome market imperfections in inputs (e.g. lithography). For 
example, although manufacturing of metallic containers is COLEP's traditional business, 
COLEP has been shifting its strategy to concentrate on the contract-filling segment (roughly 
40% of the revenues in 1996) and aerosols, which are higher value added segments. The 
success of this strategy is evident in the increased sales from 15 million dollars in 1985 to 90 
millions in 1998 (an annual average increase of 33%). In addition, foreign business accounts 
for an increased share of the revenue from 17% in 1985 to about 55% in 1998.  
 
2.3 TRANSACTION COSTS  
 
Transaction cost theory (WILLIAMSON, 1985) is frequently used to assess the 
relative merits of vertical integration vis a vis other governance models. Transaction costs 
suggests that the choice of governance model depends on the assessment of uncertainty 
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 relating inputs, frequency of exchanges between client and supplier, and asset specificity 
(WILLIAMSON, 1985; AFUAH, 2001). In addition, transaction costs theory relies on two 
basic assumptions on human nature: bounded rationality and opportunism (BARNEY; 
HESTERLY, 1996). According to the transaction cost theory, firms benefit from vertical 
integration if this solution reduces transaction and production costs; if it prevents the hazards 
from bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviors of partners, unequal bargaining power of 
the partners, and reduces the search and contract costs associated to future transactions.  
Transaction costs supported by COLEP's clients are lessened for a variety of reasons. 
First, the risk of opportunistic behaviors by COLEP is low. Even considering that COLEP has 
access to the chemical formula of the contract filling products, possible opportunistic 
behaviors could only provide short-term gains because COLEP's reputation would be 
damaged (GULATI, 1998) if, for example, it breached a contract. Furthermore, the risk of 
opportunistic behaviors is reduced because the clients outsource the production of mature 
products, where competitive advantage no longer relies on the exclusive control of know how 
(VERNON, 1966). In fact, COLEP has maintained some ties for more than thirty years, which 
reflects its ability to create stable, durable, and trusting relationships (RING; VAN DE VEN, 
1992; GRANOVETTER, 1985) that reduce transaction costs when the exchange frequency is 
high and the client made some commitment (GHEMAWAT, 1991) to the relationship.  
Second, transaction costs are reduced because the assets are not specific to the 
transaction. Williamson (1985) argued that hierarchical governance is the most efficient 
structure when the transactions are recurrent and the investments are specific to the 
transaction. COLEP's assets are easily redeployed to any client or product with minimal 
adjustments. Therefore, COLEP has alternative uses for its assets without a significant loss of 
value or productivity. In fact, COLEP works within polygamous relations (JONES et al, 
1997) and supplies several competing firms from which it accesses proprietary knowledge. 
On the other hand, clients do not make irreversible commitments to the relation because their 
assets (i.e., knowledge) may be adjusted to other suppliers (BENSAOU; ANDERSON, 1999). 
Third, COLEP is able to reduce transportation costs by vertically integrating. How is 
this done? It has actually to do with the economics of the packaging. The costs accruing from 
the transportation of containers to the customer are the main barrier to the international 
expansion of the metallic packaging producers. Packaging seems to be immobile to long 
distance transportation. However, this problem may be mitigated by either transporting a 
higher value added product (for which vertical integration of adjacent value activities is a 
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 solution) or minimizing geographic distance to the client. Only products with high value 
added, such as full aerosols, are mobile to distant markets: UK, France, Poland, Russia, and 
the US.  
 
2.4 STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING 
 
Firms worldwide are challenged to reconsider their organizational forms and 
competitive landscape (SCHENDEL, 1995) due to the deregulation of markets, rapid 
technological change, and reduction of transaction costs emerging from the new 
communication technologies (DUNNING, 1995; COMBS; METCALFE, 2000). To these 
trends firms respond by increasing disaggregation of the value chain (ZENGER; HESTERLY, 
1998) and creating novel relational models based on strategic outsourcing schemas (Gulati, 
1998; DYER; NOBEOKA, 2000). These responses help firms focus on their knowledge base 
(GRANT, 1996) while resorting to external agents (i.e., suppliers) for specialized skills 
(DYER; NOBEOKA, 2000), and using governance models that favor flexibility and 
responsiveness to market changes (QUINN; HILMER, 1994; DYER; SINGH, 1998).  
Models of strategic outsourcing tend to be based on stable collaborative relationships 
with a few (eventually only one) selected suppliers. Instead of relying on multiple suppliers 
and being subject to potentially opportunistic short-term behaviors (WILLIAMSON, 1985), 
the client firm is tied to one supplier with whom it shares know-how, information, and 
interdependence. Thus, strategic outsourcing is not based on arm's length relationships, where 
the client has bargaining power over the supplier, but rather on relational capital with 
entrusted, selected, and supportive suppliers (RING; VAN DE VEN, 1992; UZZI, 1996). The 
outcome is that firms internalize only the activities in which they have a competitive 
advantage, and that are of strategic importance (PRAHALAD; HAMEL, 1990; QUINN; 
HILMER, 1994; TEECE, 1992), or activities that are critical sources of vulnerability 
(QUINN; HILMER, 1994). Conversely, firms externalize (or contract in the market) to 
outside firms productions that are not strategically important, where they do possess a 
competitive advantage, and where suppliers are efficient. In the case of metallic container 
manufacturing, the control of the production process is not critical and does not seem to 
provide the client a competitive advantage. In addition, in the case of COLEP, a stable model 
of outsourcing seems warranted because the clients (particularly MNEs) need to transfer some 
proprietary knowledge (e.g. chemical formulas) for the contract filling operations. Finally, 
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 because there are other potential suppliers of the containers besides COLEP, the outsourcing 
of packaging does not entail a vulnerability, or a disadvantageous bargaining position. 
However, effective outsourcing is not outsourcing as much as possible; effective 
outsourcing is about achieving the very best long-term risk-adjusted rate of return. The costs 
of outsourcing stem from searching, contracting, monitoring, enforcing contracts, and the 
hazards of outsourcing emerge primarily from opportunistic behaviors of the outsourced 
suppliers (WILLIAMSON, 1985). The risks of these sourcing strategies materialize in 
potential hold-up costs gestated by the outsourcing regimes (WILLIAMSON, 1985) and their 
instability. For example, a recent report by Dun & Bradstreet (OZANNE, 2000) notes that 
more than 20% of the outsourcing relationships fail within two years, and 50% within five. 
However, models of strategic outsourcing entail resilience of the relationship client-supplier 
that is seemingly at odds with standard economic rationale of self-interest seeking behavior by 
clients and suppliers ( UZZI, 1996). Thus, strategic outsourcing relies on the expectation of a 
repeated game in an embedded cooperative relationship, where one might expect cooperation 
to persist when self-interest is between achieved through cooperation (UZZI, 1996). Several 
of COLEP's relationships with clients have been lasting for the last thirty years, which in itself 
is an evidence that the returns from the cooperation are high. 
In sum, strategic outsourcing is an intermediate degree of externalization of 
production (or other activities) that the firm is not able, is not efficient, or does not want to 
carry in-house, but where pure off-the-shelf recruiting might involve risks of strategic nature, 
or superior costs. In other words, strategic outsourcing involves shifting activities from within 
the internal boundary of the firm to trusted external agents in a long-term orientation that 
involves exchange of firm-specific information and knowledge (UZZI, 1996).  
 
2.5 COLEP'S INTERNATIONALIZATION 
 
The literature has recognized that the modes of foreign operation tend to evolve 
sequentially from exports to partnerships (e.g., joint ventures, strategic alliances), and to 
foreign direct investment (e.g., greenfield, acquisition of incumbent firms) (JOHANSON; 
VAHLNE, 1977, 1990). Alternative explanations for firms' internationalization stress 
internationalization as the mechanism for the exploitation and appropriation of returns from 
innovation (CAGUSVIL, 1980; RUGMAN, 1981; HENNART, 1982), as an oligopolistic 
reaction to competitors' strategies (KINDLEBERGER, 1969; KNICKERBOCKER, 1973), 
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 product adoption (VERNON, 1966), or simply a follow the client approach (LI; GUISINGER, 
1992). Recent studies devoted attentions to the internationalization of small and medium-
sized firms with limited international experience (OVIATT; MCDOUGALL, 1994). These 
firms do not have slack financial and human resources to single-handedly sustain the onus of 
international expansion, and are more dependent on their network of "facilitating" ties than 
large firms (ELLIS, 2000). Oviatt and McDougall (1994) argued that the traditional factors 
that characterized the evolutionary model are no longer present (e.g., transportation and 
communication costs are decreasing), which raises the question of what the current factors are 
that drive firms to internalize activities across geographic markets. The more flexible models 
of the MNE (BUCKLEY; CASSON, 1998) rely upon the skills and capabilities the focal firm 
may exploit abroad, and the international specialization of the firm. Flexible firms require a 
focus on the core competences (PRAHALAD; HAMEL, 1990) and increased magnitude and 
frequency of collaboration with other firms (CONTRACTOR; LORANGE, 1988).  
COLEP's internationalization reflects the internationalization process proposed in 
prior research. It was initially reactive, initiated in the simple supply of foreign firms in 
Portugal, but it evolved through partnerships at home, an acquisition abroad, and a greenfield 
investment. Figure 1 depicts COLEP's gradual internationalization process. 
 
 
 Countries
a
Portugal 86b
Spain 82 93
France 95
U. Kingdom 86
Angola 91/96
Poland 97 99
Russia 97
Saudi Arabia 85/86
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 - Direct export
 - FDI through joint venture
 - Turn-key operation
 - FDI with acquisition of 100%
 - FDI Green field
a - Ordered according to psychic distance from Portugal
b - Sold in 1996 after CC&S acquired CMB  
Figure 1 - COLEP's internationalization process 
Source: data collected in interviews. 
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 The following sub-sections describe succinctly COLEP's major internationalization 
steps and the characteristics of the entry modes adopted. COLEP's internationalization 
highlights the development of firm-specific capabilities, and how the firm is able to exploit its 
advantages across markets.  
Partnerships at home 
Partnerships in the home market frequently contribute to develop firm's capabilities 
and growth (ROOT, 1994). Small firms' capabilities are often developed passively through the 
supply of MNEs in the home market. This was the case with COLEP's supply of Shell, British 
Petroleum, Lever, Johnson Wax, Colgate-Palmolive, Mobil, and Reckitt & Colman. However, 
COLEP's knowledge, quality standards, and know-how were originally developed through the 
supply of large national companies such as Carnes Nobre, Victor Guedes, Cin, Robbialac, and 
Petrogal. Several of these partnerships persisted for the last thirty years, which is in conflict 
with the claim that about 50% of the outsourcing partnerships do not last beyond five years 
(OZANNE, 2000). The supply of clients at home might be leveraged to supply foreign clients 
through exports.  
 COLEP's equity joint venture in 1986 with the multinational Carnaud MetalBox 
(CMB), the CMB-COLEP, to manufacture easy-opening metallic cans for the Portuguese 
canned fish industry (e.g. sardines) represented a significant move and learning experience for 
COLEP. Joint ventures are mechanisms for learning (HAMEL, 1991: GULATI, 1998). The 
joint venture CMB-COLEP dominated the Portuguese domestic market until Crown Cork & 
Seal took over CMB and acquired COLEP's share of the joint venture. CMB-COLEP was also 
a defensive oligopololistic reaction (KNICKERBOCKER, 1973) by COLEP to protect the 
domestic market because CMB already owned six subsidiaries in the neighboring Spanish 
market. 
Turnkey operations 
Vertical integration presupposes firm-specific advantages (or ownership advantages - 
DUNNING, 1998) of some kind that is either based on intangible or tangible resources 
(BARNEY, 1991), or on relational capital (UZZI, 1996). Through the vertical integration of 
virtually all stages of the package value chain COLEP developed intensive manufacturing and 
technical knowledge. In addition, the stable business relationships with reputable  clients  
(some in the oil business) provided COLEP with reputation spillovers and made it an 
attractive partner for an array of projects. These two factors, knowledge and reputation, seem 
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 to have driven two turnkey operations contracts for the oil industry; one for the "Savola 
Company" in Saudi Arabia in 1985-86, and the other for "Van Leer" in Angola in 1991-96.  
Turnkey operations are another internationalization model used by COLEP reflecting 
the exploitation of the firm's capabilities (MARCH, 1991). The construction of metal 
packaging factories is only feasible for highly reputed firms that possess the resources, 
technological capacity, know-how, and the reputation to be a credible partner for large scale 
projects. In fact, these two turnkey contracts originated long-term relationships that extended 
to the education of human resources, and technical and maintenance assistance. 
Acquisition in Spain 
In 1993, COLEP acquired Johnson Wax's Spanish contract filler subsidiary. This 
subsidiary was exclusively a contract filler of mass consumption products, and was endowed 
with technology not yet known to COLEP. The acquisition of incumbent firms is a 
particularly interesting entry strategy when the acquired firm possesses superior resources or 
technology, because in these cases, acquisitions are vehicles for learning (BARKEMA; 
VERMEULEN, 1998). The acquisition of this subsidiary emerged from Johnson Wax's 
efforts to rationalize its European production and concentrate manufacturing activity in 
Netherlands, and was preceded by COLEP's exports of metallic containers to the Spanish 
market.  
Several reasons lie behind the acquisition in Spain. First, it increased COLEP's 
production capacity in contract filling - the activity that has the highest value added. 
Currently, COLEP's manufacturing capacity surpasses 160 million containers, endowing it the 
largest European contract filler. Second, the acquisition brought an inflow of technology and 
know-how in distribution since the Spanish subsidiary had developed a logistics system with 
its own fleet of trucks and multiple distribution platforms in Iberia. Third, the acquisition 
allowed COLEP to exploit scale and scope economies in the production of metallic 
containers, filling, and distribution. Fourth, the acquisition placed COLEP closer to major 
markets (e.g., France, UK), which is particularly important for relatively immobile products 
such as packaging. Finally, it avoided the acquisition of JW's subsidiary by a competitor 
whose rivalry would likely to be felt in the Portuguese market as well.  
Greenfield investment in Poland 
Greenfield operations tend to be utilized when the focal firm has some firm-specific 
advantage that is best appropriated through internalization, when the characteristics of the 
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 product or of the host market do not permit service at a distance (e.g., exports), or when there 
is no available target incumbent for an acquisition (ROOT, 1994). Although greenfield 
investments permit full control over the new subsidiary they also entail an irreversible 
commitment to the host market (ROOT, 1994). Hence, it is not unusual for greenfield 
investments to be preceded by exports to the host country or partnerships with local firms 
(ROOT, 1994). COLEP had previous direct and indirect exports to Poland prior to the 
greenfield entry. Specifically, COLEP exported selected metallic containers to UK contract 
fillers that re-exported them to Poland already full. Poland is an attractive market due to its 
proximity to other Northern and Eastern Europe countries. It represented about 4% of the 
exports of EU producers in 1994 (source: SEFEL). Furthermore, investing in Poland meant an 
opportunity to participate in the outburst of the Eastern countries' economic development. 
There are also other external factors that explain the greenfield investment in a 
manufacturing subsidiary in Poland. First is the availability of raw and intermediate products 
of reasonable quality. Second is a favorable labor market (both in availability and quality). 
Third is the prospect for Poland joining the EU, which it did in 2005. Besides, transportation 
costs represent 20% to 25% of the total cost in some product lines conferring proximity to 
clients essential to improve firm's competitiveness.  
 
3 DISCUSSION & THEORY ADVANCEMENT 
 
Prior literature has advised firms to concentrate on cost-saving and core-competence-
exploitation when making decisions on vertical integration and outsourcing. Based on a case 
study of COLEP, we argue that such analysis of benefits and hazards of vertical integration 
and outsourcing is insufficient. From a dynamic perspective, we posit that vertical integration 
by the supplier may be a strategic response to changes in the sourcing model of the client 
industries. Suppliers may follow a diverse strategy, as in the case of COLEP, to accommodate 
changes in the clients' range of activities (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999). Thus, vertical 
integration can be an appropriate strategy for suppliers to tap into the newly open markets 
emerging from the disaggregation of the MNEs activities (ZENGER; HESTERLY, 1998) in 
what Dunning (1995) called the age of 'alliance capitalism'.  
Vertical integration by suppliers may be a strategic choice to respond to the growing 
des-internalization and international specialization of MNEs' activities. Through vertical 
integration suppliers may assume the clients' full product value chain activities. COLEP 
developed a broad array of capabilities that facilitated the expansion to foreign markets both 
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 through the full supply of its clients and through the development of special contracts (e.g. the 
turnkey operations). The internalization of sequential product value chain activities permits 
fuller utilization of unequal minimum efficient scales of the activities internalized with cost 
economies benefits, which are the basis for cost-driven competitive advantages.   
Providing a full service to its clients COLEP approaches an in-sourcing solution 
characterized by stability, trust, and low transaction costs, despite some level of asset 
specificity and significant transfers of knowledge. This model builds relational capital despite 
the "polygamous" character of the relationships (JONES et al., 1997). The polygamous 
character of the relations of COLEP with its clients is a distinctive advantage of COLEP and 
illustrates a model that sustains stable relationships client-supplier that contrasts with the 
occasional outsourcing or arm's length exchanges. A set of theoretically-driven propositions 
may be drawn: 
Proposition 1. Vertical integration can be used as strategic responses to the change of a 
firm’s upstream/downstream business models. 
Proposition 2. Outsourcing can be used strategic responses to the change of a firm’s 
upstream/downstream business models. 
Firms emerging from small, quasi-first world, countries such as Portugal, are pushed 
to leave the country's political boundaries and search for clients abroad. This exit is made 
easier whenever the firm has some credible form of differentiation. Simultaneously, one needs 
to consider the nature of the product. When the nature of the product hinders the service of 
markets at a distance, such as is the case with metallic containers, the firm's 
internationalization may benefit from developing a full service strategy through vertical 
integration, manufacturing of a wide array of products, and focus on the higher value added 
activities. This was COLEP's strategy: to partner for the full outsourcing of its clients' needs, 
which required developing a high level of vertical integration.  
The internationalization path is the result of internal strategies, and external 
constraints and opportunities (ROOT, 1994). Motives for internationalization vary 
considerably among firms, and frequently path dependent choices or strategies impact on the 
future internationalization of the firm (ROOT, 1994; JOHANSON; VAHLNE, 1977). For 
example, COLEP's internationalization path was not independent of the historical political 
constraints in the Portuguese market in the 70's. When in 1975 Johnson Wax sought to enter 
the Portuguese market the high political risk (in 1974 the Portuguese revolution ended 40 
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 years of an autocratic regime) hindered Johnson Wax from taking the risk accruing from 
foreign direct investment operations in Portugal. The solution Johnson Wax found was to 
develop a domestic producer through some technology transfer. In addition, COLEP's vertical 
integration seems to reflect substantial supply-side inefficiencies in the Portuguese market for 
intermediate inputs. These inefficiencies stemmed from a highly cartelized market. For 
example, the lithography was concentrated on a few small-sized producers that had low 
production capacity, insufficient quality, and obsolete technology.  
Proposition 3. The resource endowment of a firm’s home country influences the firm’s vertical integration 
decisions in its domestic and international operations.  
 
3.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This case has potential interest for managerial and regulation policies. Innovation and development of internal 
competencies are indispensable for the generation of competitive advantages, and these competencies may be 
exploitable in foreign markets. Similar firms need to evaluate (a) the level of vertical integration and autonomy 
for the subsidiaries, (b) the management of the client portfolio, and (c) the level of defensive investment needed. 
The former may lead to international alignments customers-supplier. The value of the relationship customer-
vendor surpasses the net present benefits of the contracts. The trust (GRANOVETTER, 1985) between client and 
supplier may permit the replication of the relational model in other markets, embodying a powerful lever for the 
internationalization of the firm. It is reasonable to assume that this is particularly important for small firms with 
limited international experience. The internationalization of firms from numerous industries may be vastly 
facilitated by the creation of stable relationships with MNEs that will help reduce the risks, and costs, associated 
to the presence in foreign markets. Industrial government-led policies may intervene in the creation of these ties 
in the domestic market. 
Out study also offers implications for future academic research. The propositions 
derived from this case study need to be advanced further and empirically investigated in a 
large sample, in order to create knowledge more generable to other firms. [MORE] Given the 
development of hybrid relationships between markets and hierarchies, it is also interesting to 
study the degree of stability of the relationships with MNEs through licensing contracts, or 
other governance forms. Finally, the extent to which cooperation in the domestic market may 
be a lever for international expansion warrants additional research. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude, this study contributes to the broader discussion of where one may draw 
the boundaries of the firm. Specifically, we noted that contemporary vertical integration may 
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 be examined beyond the traditional transaction costs between agents, rather as a manner to 
develop firm-specific capabilities that can be exploited within and outside the traditional 
national and technological boundaries. The choice between in and out sourcing, or any hybrid 
form emerges from the evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of the alternatives, 
including those that result from the appropriation of specific advantages.  
This case study presents evidence that vertical integration permits suppliers to develop 
competencies that encourage new forms of business (e.g. turnkey operations) in multiple 
markets. The model chosen by the focal firm is designed with a level of considerable vertical 
integration that corresponds to the full externalization of the clients' manufacturing activities. 
This is interesting in an era of alliance capitalism (DUNNING, 1995) and permits even small 
firms to develop differentiated competitive positions in the industry. These positions may 
constitute the basis for firms' survival and growth. 
 
INTEGRAÇÃO VERTICAL PARA O OUTSOURCING COMPLETO: 
CRESCIMENTO E INTERNACIONALIZAÇÃO DE UMA EMPRESA 
PORTUGUESA DE EMBALAGEM 
 
RESUMO 
 
Com base no estudo de um caso de uma empresa portuguesa de embalagem, este artigo 
analisa como a integração vertical do fornecedor permite o outsouring completo das 
necessidades da empresa cliente. Esta solução reduz os custos de transacção, favorece a 
especialização, e permite a pequenas e medias empresas o desenvolvimento de competencies 
que podem ser exploradas numa grande variedade de projectos. A integração vertical pelo 
fornecedor (decisão de governança) é uma resposta estratégica às mudanças nos modelos de 
fornecimento dos clientes. As relações cliente-fornecedor têm valor inter-espacial e inter-
temporal que ultrapassa as transacções ocasionais no mercado. 
 
Palavras-chave: Outsourcing estratégico. Integração vertical. Internacionalização. Caso de 
estudo. 
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